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ABSTRACT: Christopher Fuchs has recently offered a provocative version of quantum mechanical realism, which is 
based on the suggestion that quantum probabilities merit a subjective interpretation. His proposal, how-
ever, has been charged with inconsistency by Amit Hagar (2003), who argues that interpreting quantum 
probabilities subjectively is inconsistent with the realist claims Fuchs wants to maintain for the quantum 
system and the dimensionality of the Hilbert space that accompanies it. In this paper I first outline the fun-
damentals of Fuchs’s approach and then take up the task of rebutting Hagar’s charge by demonstrating the 
internal coherence of Fuchs’s realism. 




One of the few things in the foundations of Quantum Mechanics (QM) that is gener-
ally agreed upon is that quantum probabilities require an objective interpretation. Re-
cently, however, Christopher Fuchs and his collaborators (cf. Caves et al. 2002a, 
2002b, 2007, Fuchs 2003) have presented an account according to which the prob-
abilities of QM are best understood as subjective degrees of belief. As I explain in the first 
part of the paper, Fuchs does not deny that QM describes some objective features of 
the world but rather intends to integrate his proposal within a more general pro-
gramme, which is supposed to draw a clear-cut line between the subjective and the 
objective elements of QM. Thus Fuchs’s proposal can be described as a broadly realis-
tic one, with the qualification that not all elements of the formalism of current non-
relativistic QM can be assumed to correspond to elements of reality. 
 Fuchs’s argument has been recently criticised by Amit Hagar, who claims that it is 
impossible to accept a subjective interpretation of quantum probabilities and at the 
same time offer a realistic account, however qualified, of QM. More specifically he ar-
gues that the use of subjective probabilities forces us to ignore the measurement prob-
lem of QM and thus commits us to instrumentalism. In the second part of this paper I 
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investigate and assess the legitimacy of Hagar’s claim. More specifically, I argue that 
one need not be an instrumentalist in general about QM if one chooses to interpret 
quantum probabilities subjectively. If I am correct, it follows that Fuchs’s minimal re-
alist position is internally perfectly consistent and, hence, cannot be challenged in the 
way Hagar claims. 
2. Quantum probabilities as subjective degrees of belief 
Fuchs’s general orientation is to provide a reformulation of all the axioms of QM in 
information-theoretic terms. This demand stems from his belief that “quantum me-
chanics has always been about information” (Fuchs 2003, p. 989) and, Fuchs thinks, if 
satisfied, will clarify the persistent conceptual problems in the foundations of QM. At 
the same time, once we acquire a grasp of the subjective elements of QM, we should 
be able to draw the line between the subjective and the objective and thereby maintain 
a realistic stance towards those elements of the theory that merit this treatment.  
 The link of QM with information and the proposal that we should seek to under-
stand QM in information-theoretic terms is traced by Fuchs back to Einstein and the 
famous EPR paradox.2 EPR allegedly established the incompleteness of the quantum 
formalism, i.e. that the wave function does not give us a full description of reality. This 
result is consistent with an epistemic interpretation of the probabilities derived via 
Born’s rule. Epistemic interpretations of the probability calculus construe probabilities 
as a measure of our degrees of belief. This is in contrast to objective interpretations, which 
take probabilities to reflect objective features of the physical world.3 Regardless of 
whether Einstein himself subscribed to an epistemic view of quantum probabilities, 
Fuchs is more than willing to do so. Sharing with Einstein the conclusion that the 
quantum formalism is incomplete, he goes on to endorse an epistemic interpretation 
of quantum probabilities in the particular form of Subjective Bayesianism.  
 Fuchs, however, is careful not to endorse Einstein’s hopes about the possibility of a 
fuller description of physical reality, now commonly referred to as a ‘hidden-variables 
approach’. The reasons for doing so have to do with the advantage of time: if one is 
willing to accept locality as a reasonable constraint, as Fuchs is, then Bell’s no-go theo-
rem, which proves that all hidden-variables theories have to be non-local, is a serious 
predicament. Furthermore the Kochen-Specker no-go theorem, which precludes the 
possibility of assigning values to all observables in all states, is an even greater prob-
lem for a hidden-variables approach. In the face of these difficulties Fuchs proceeds 
to a most contentious point: he claims that QM is incomplete, given the way the world 
is (cf. ibid. pp. 994-995). 
 Although not entirely clear, Fuchs’s basic argument seems to be that the incom-
pleteness of QM shows us that the quantum state is best seen as representing incom-
plete information and quantum probabilities as being subjective degrees of belief. Had 
we been able to complete this information, we would arrive at the Einsteinian ideal of 
                                                     
2 In fact, Fuchs (2003, p. 993) acknowledges that this line of thought “had a long pre-history with Ein-
stein alone”, yet he still takes EPR to contain its ‘paradigmatic’ explication.  
3 For more details on the distinction between epistemic vs. objective probability see Gillies (2000).  
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a hidden-variables theory. Yet the various no-go theorems suggest the untenability of 
this aim and one plausible explanation for this is that “there is something about the 
world that keeps us from ever getting more information than can be captured through 
the formal structure of quantum mechanics” (ibid. p. 995). This is a radical ontological 
claim, one that allows Fuchs to declare all quantum probabilities as indispensable subjec-
tive degrees of belief, in the sense that probabilistic statements are unavoidable given 
the above constraint on our epistemology. According to this interpretation then — 
though Fuchs denies the term ‘interpretation’— “quantum theory does not describe 
physical reality. What it does is provide an algorithm for computing probabilities for the 
macroscopic events … that are the consequences of our experimental interventions” 
(Fuchs and Peres 2000, p. 70). 
 What, then, remains from QM that can be given a realistic interpretation? First of 
all, it is important to be clear as to what it means to be realist about QM. Along with 
most contemporary scientific realists, I take it that a quantum mechanical realist holds 
the following two theses: A) the semantic thesis that QM should be taken at face value, 
i.e. as capable of being genuinely true or false about its domain of description, and not 
as a mere algorithm for prediction, and B) the epistemic thesis that we have good rea-
sons to think QM is actually a true, or at least approximately true, description of its 
domain and that the unobservable entities it postulates (or at least most of them) do 
exist in the world.4 According to Fuchs, the only concepts that can be reasonably be-
lieved to correspond to elements of reality are the quantum system and the dimension of the 
Hilbert space associated with that system (Fuchs 2003, pp. 989, 1018-1021).5 The quan-
tum states are considered to be states of belief without any objective ontological sig-
nificance, mere algorithms for predicting the usual macroscopic experimental phe-
nomena. In other words, Fuchs’s account is a minimal realist one, allowing for very few 
elements of QM to be taken at face value and correspond to real entities in the world. 
The rest are just instruments for prediction. Consequently, Fuchs’s position is an in-
teresting blend of realism and instrumentalism, with some parts of QM meriting a 
realistic interpretation and others only an instrumentalist one.  
                                                     
3. Reconstructing Hagar’s challenge 
In a recent paper Amit Hagar has challenged Fuchs’s claim that one can adopt a sub-
jective account of quantum probabilities and still maintain some form of realism about 
some parts of QM. Instead he suggested that “the epistemic view can be rendered 
4 Incidentally this formulation of the realist thesis shows why a hidden-variables theory is not the only 
candidate for a realistic approach to QM. No matter how complicated or strange a theory is, one can 
maintain a realistic stance about it as long as one holds some kind of correspondence thesis between 
that theory and the entities it postulates and the world. What makes hidden-variables theories more 
appealing as realist candidates is their kinship with our common-sense ontology rather than any ar-
gument establishing that they should be the only candidates.  
5 I think that Fuchs’s realism would remain an interesting position, even if it turned out that all real-world 
systems have infinite dimensional Hilbert spaces. This is because it would still contribute an interest-
ing insight into the nature of reality, no matter how complicated the latter might end up being (I am 
grateful to an anonymous referee for bringing this point to my attention).  
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consistent only at the price of denying even the weakest form of realism Fuchs alludes to” 
(Hagar 2003, p. 763; my emphasis). Hagar’s argument though is quite cryptic so it 
needs some spelling out.  
 Hagar claims that ignoring or rather sidestepping the well-known measurement 
problem of QM, as Fuchs in effect proposes to by means of his epistemic interpreta-
tion of quantum probabilities, is tantamount to endorsing instrumentalism. By using a 
thought experiment, which he attributes to Meir Hemmo and which is a standard 
‘Wigner’s friend’ scenario, Hagar’s challenge can be reconstructed as a dilemma: either 
(i) the epistemic account of probabilities is inconsistent or, (ii) if rendered consistent, it commits us to 
instrumentalism. Furthermore, he implicitly makes the more general claim that (iii) a 
subjectivist approach to quantum probabilities, even if consistent in the first place, 
implies some form of metaphysical anti-realism.  
 Hemmo’s thought experiment, as expounded by Hagar (cf. ibid. pp. 763-764), runs 
as follows: consider two people, Eve and Adam. Eve is in the laboratory and performs 
a measurement of a spin-1/2 electron, while Adam is outside of it. Before the meas-
urement they both have the same knowledge of the situation in the lab, namely the su-
perposition of the possible states of the spin of the electron |Ψ1〉 = 1/ 2 |↑〉 + 
1/ 2 |↓〉 (1), the arrows standing for the possible spin outcomes, up and down re-
spectively. The measurement problem suggests that after the measurement has taken place 
the measuring device gets infected by the initial superposition. The result is a new su-
perposition |Ψ2 〉 = 1/ 2 |↑ 〉 |↑M 〉 + 1/ 2 |↓ 〉|↓M 〉 (2), with the subscript M indi-
cating the reading of the measuring device. 
 Eve, however, is inside the lab and, in order to resolve the problem, she employs 
the collapse postulate, which, from the standpoint of the epistemic view, is now un-
derstood in an instrumentalist fashion as a mere updating rule. Having experienced the 
outcome of the experiment, her new degree of belief for, say, spin up changes from 
0.5 to 1. Adam, on the other hand, is outside the lab. Being unable to see what the 
outcome of the experiment is, his knowledge of the situation remains the same as be-
fore and is described by the superposition (2). Clearly, Adam’s prediction for spin up 
is probabilistic, with probability 0.5.  
 Hagar (cf. ibid. p. 763) realises that this incompatibility between the two predic-
tions need not worry the subjectivist. As is well known, when a Subjective Bayesian 
acquires new evidence, she updates by means of well-defined rules her assignment of 
prior probabilities to the hypotheses under consideration. Eve is inside the laboratory, 
so after the measurement she knows what she has measured and she updates her be-
liefs accordingly. Adam, on the other hand, is outside of it and, not knowing the out-
come of the measurement, has got no new evidence to use in order to update his own 
degrees of belief. Clearly our two agents do not update their (common) initial beliefs 
under the light of the same data. Consequently, it is perfectly natural that they reach 
different results. 
 The trouble for the subjectivist however, claims Hagar, comes from another direc-
tion. He believes that QM can give rise to other kinds of incompatible descriptions of 
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the same situation, which do not admit of an epistemic interpretation. Demonstrating 
the possibility of such an event would prove the epistemic view inconsistent.  
 Such a case, he argues, arises from the, admittedly physically implausible, possibil-
ity of Adam performing operations in the lab. As we saw earlier, after the measure-
ment Eve’s state is either |U 〉 = |↑ 〉|↑M 〉 or |D 〉 = |↓ 〉|↓M 〉, depending on the 
outcome of the experiment. Let’s assume she got spin up. Adam’s on the other hand 
is the superposition 
|Φ 〉 = 1/ 2  |↑〉 |↑M 〉 + 1/ 2  |↓〉 |↓M 〉 = 1/ 2  ( )〉+〉 DU | | .         (3) 
 Now let Adam perform an operation in the lab in the form of a unitary transfor-
mation as follows:  
|U 〉 → 1/ 2 ( )〉+〉 DU | |            (4) 
|D 〉 → 1/ 2 ( )〉−〉 DU | |            (5) 
 In that case, (3) reduces to |U 〉 for Adam, who now assigns his prediction for spin 
up probability 1, while Eve’s description for spin up, formerly given by |U 〉, is now 
given by (4) and her prediction is probabilistic with probability 0.5.6 The claim here is 
that this divergence of predictions cannot be given an information-theoretic interpreta-
tion. If this last claim is correct, then, assuming the legitimacy of the formalism, the 
epistemic view of quantum probabilities is inconsistent. 
 The charge of instrumentalism comes about once we try to respond to the alleged 
paradox from the standpoint of the epistemic account of probabilities. Hagar consid-
ers two ways out, both of which would lead to instrumentalism. The first (cf. ibid. p. 
765) would be to suggest that due to decoherence, Eve’s superposition, given by (4), 
would vanish. Thus for all practical purposes (FAPP) we would face no real threat of in-
consistency. Strictly speaking, however, decoherence only allows for the usual observ-
able macroscopic phenomena to be recovered. What actually happens in the world is 
explicitly left out of its domain, usually on pragmatic grounds. Such a stance though is 
very congenial to instrumentalism, since all we have in our hands is (at best) a good 
predictive device, which need not be taken at face value. 
 The second possible way out is the so-called Erasure Objection (cf. ibid. pp. 765-
767). On the basis of the time-reversal-invariant character of orthodox QM it might 
be claimed that such an experiment would allow Adam to ‘erase’ Eve’s memory. This 
would lead to the erasure of the collapse of the spin measurement from her memory, 
which gives rise to the incompatible predictions after Adam’s operations in the lab, 
and thereby consistency would be restored. Hagar argues that this line of reasoning 
leads to the subordination of one’s ontology to one’s epistemology. This is because 
the Erasure Objection appears to relativise quantum probabilities to the observer and 
in this way introduce “an arbitrary cut between the observer and Nature” (ibid. p. 
                                                     
6 Of course Eve’s prediction for spin up would be the same even if she had measured ‘spin-down’ be-
cause of the nature of the transformations. 
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767). And although this last point sounds more like idealism rather than instrumental-
ism, it is certainly unacceptable for a realist.  
 The final point of Hagar’s, namely that a subjectivist approach to quantum 
probabilities implies some form of metaphysical anti-realism is not explicit in his 
paper but can be read off his comments regarding the Erasure Objection. It becomes 
evident once we consider what follows his comment I just mentioned above. Stated 
more fully, Hagar claims that 
relativising quantum probabilities to the observer …is tantamount to stipulating an arbitrary cut 
between the observer and Nature. …[A]ccording to the epistemic view what counts as real, i.e. as 
having definite properties, is now dependent on where this cut is made. (Ibid., p. 767) 
 Although these remarks are intended to explicate the implications of the Erasure 
Objection, they mostly serve to present a general charge against subjectivism in the 
context of QM. Hagar seems to be drawing attention to the main message of 
‘Wigner’s friend’ scenario, namely that there appears to be no non-arbitrary way to 
distinguish between the classical and the quantum realms. The subjectivist wishes to 
maintain that the quantum state is only an algorithm, an instrument for predicting the 
usual macroscopic experimental phenomena. At the same time, however, she must ac-
cept that it is always possible to assign a quantum state to macroscopic objects and 
situations, including the macroscopic phenomena that she takes for granted. But then, 
the argument goes, what is the rationale for denying reality only to certain properties 
of objects belonging to the micro-world and not to the corresponding properties of 
other objects belonging to the macro-world? It appears, that is, that Fuchs’s subjectiv-
ist still needs to defend more adequately the ‘cut’ between the quantum and the classi-
cal realms if his minimalist version of realism is to be tenable.7
4. Tackling the Challenge 
In the rest of the paper I will try to show that Hagar’s criticism is unsuccessful. I will 
advance and support the following two main theses for this purpose: (a) Like in the 
case before the operations have taken place, similarly no real inconsistency arises for 
the Bayesian due to the divergence of opinions about the predictions of our two 
agents after the operations. The reason is that it is very easy for her to accommodate 
this divergence within her framework. (b) The issue of inconsistency aside, it is mis-
taken to suggest that adhering to a subjective account of quantum probabilities com-
mits one to any form of metaphysical anti-realism. It should be clear that (a) is in-
tended to neutralise Hagar’s dilemma, by denying point (i), while (b) aims at rebutting 
Hagar’s general charge (iii). In concluding, I will also briefly indicate a possible direc-
tion for a more fruitful criticism of Fuchs’s realism. 
4.1. Resisting the dilemma 
Recall the main claim Hagar makes in presenting Hemmo’s thought experiment. Al-
though the initial incompatibility after Eve’s measurement but without Adam’s opera-
                                                     
7 I am indebted to an anonymous referee for pointing out the importance of this dimension of Hagar’s 
critique. 
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tions in the lab need pose no problems to the subjectivist, this is not so for the situa-
tion that ensues after both Eve’s measurement and Adam’s operations. This means that 
there is an alleged difference in kind between the first and the second case of diver-
gent results, such that the first can and the second cannot be given an information-
theoretic interpretation.  
 The closest Hagar gets into providing the rationale for this claim is in the following 
quote: 
For these special observables, if Eve and Adam compute the probabilities for subsequent meas-
urements to be carried out at some time on the information that is available to them now, they will 
inevitably come up with different predictions.  
He continues saying that  
Hemmo concludes that this indicates that the epistemic view is inconsistent, since it yields two 
different predictions for one and the same experiment, no matter how complicated and difficult 
the actual performance of the experiment will be. (Ibid., p. 764) 
 Now, this allusion to ‘Hemmo’s conclusion’ might give the impression that Hagar 
intends to distance himself from it. This appearance, nonetheless, is deceptive. Hagar’s 
very starting point is Hemmo’s charge of incoherence. Furthermore, Hagar himself 
makes it abundantly clear that the charge of instrumentalism arises out of the need to 
oppose Hemmo’s argument (cf. ibid., 764).8 This means, however, that, if anything, 
Hagar must believe that Hemmo’s thought experiment is at least a prima facie problem 
for the epistemic view. Indeed, if it is not, then one is left wondering why Hagar 
thinks it is so important to come up with an answer to it that runs the danger of con-
tradicting Fuchs’s realist aspirations.   
 In effect, Hagar seems to be thinking as follows: in the first case of incompatibility, 
which arose after Eve applied the collapse postulate, it was easy for the subjectivist to 
interpret the divergence of opinions as the result of updating common initial knowl-
edge on different data, i.e. knowledge of the outcome of the experiment in the case of 
Eve and no new knowledge at all in the case of Adam. In the second case, however, 
no such interpretation is possible, since both Adam and Eve have the same information, 
yet they reach different results. At any rate, it is this last claim which has to be sub-
stantiated in order to demonstrate the inconsistency of the epistemic view; namely that 
two agents, starting with the same degrees of belief and updating in the light of the 
same data end up with incompatible predictions.  
 Is, however, the story between Adam and Eve such a case? I don’t think so for the 
following reason. In the first case of divergence, Adam and Eve started with the same 
information, i.e. the initial superposition, and then updated their knowledge in the 
light of different data. This is why it was natural for their predictions to diverge. Now 
Adam conducts his operations in the lab only after Eve’s measurement has taken place, 
i.e. only after both himself and Eve have reached different predictions. To be sure, the 
operations are the same for both of them, which means that if they are to be inter-
preted in information-theoretic terms, they have to be considered as evidence (or in-
formation of some sort) common to both agents. Yet, as we just noted, old prior beliefs 
                                                     
8 Hagar repeats this point in the concluding summary of his argument (see Hagar 2003, p. 767). 
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have already been updated once, resulting in the first innocuous case of incompatibility. 
Whatever happens from here onwards will take place on the basis of the new prior be-
liefs, which are the old posterior beliefs on a Bayesian account. This means though that 
Adam’s operations will affect in the same way different prior beliefs resulting, once again 
naturally, in different results. Once more, though, this is no inconsistency at all, since 
different prior beliefs updated on the same evidence quite trivially result in different 
posterior ones.  
 Furthermore, this conclusion also holds for the following possible modification of 
the thought experiments’ interpretation.9 It might be countered that the crux of the 
thought experiment becomes apparent if we consider not Eve and Adam, but Eve and 
her own would-be thoughts had she contemplated herself in Adam’s place. In this case we 
would end up not with two individuals having different degrees of belief but with one 
and the same person holding differing degrees of belief under different circumstances. 
 Despite the air of paradox that this interpretation introduces, there is no inconsis-
tency in this case either. The following sentence is surely a truism for a Bayesian, if not 
for everyone: ‘I can have certain beliefs now and also quite consistently contemplate 
myself justifiably holding different beliefs in a counterfactual situation in which I would 
be differently informed’. Yet this very truism applies in the case of Eve contemplating 
herself in the shoes of Adam. Inside the lab, Eve knows certain things and after the 
transformations she updates her beliefs and reaches a probabilistic prediction. Now, 
upon contemplating the counterfactual state of her being outside the lab and updating 
different initial beliefs in the light of the same information (i.e. the transformations), it 
is very natural for her to conclude that she would have reached different results. There 
is nothing whatsoever in the subjectivist conception that forces her to entertain the 
same beliefs across the board of possible information circumstances. 
 Hence, the alleged inconsistency is no inconsistency after all. There is no difference in 
kind between the two cases such that the second, unlike the first, does not admit of an 
information-theoretic interpretation. Consequently, Hagar’s initial dilemma has been 
taken by its first horn and given an answer. This means, however, that one need not 
trouble oneself with the issue of instrumentalism and/or anti-realism at this stage. 
Since the charge of instrumentalism follows from our attempts to restore consistency 
(namely, FAAP and the Erasure Objection), showing that there is no inconsistency in 
the first place relieves us from the need to resort to solutions with such implications.  
4.2. Quantum Bayesianism, Anti-realism and the Quantum/Classical ‘Cut’  
The only remaining way one might take in order to undermine Fuch’s minimalist real-
ism is Hagar’s implicit charge that a subjectivist account of quantum probabilities, 
even if internally consistent in the first place, commits one to metaphysical anti-
realism. Recall that the danger here stems from the main message of Hagar’s ‘Wigner’s 
friend’ scenario rather than the details of his thought-experiment, namely that there 
seems to be no natural dividing line by which to distinguish between the classical and 
the quantum realms. Fuchs’s realist maintains that quantum states are merely an in-
                                                     
9 I am grateful to Guido Bacciagalupi for suggesting to me this possibility.  
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strument for prediction, an algorithm that allows us to compute probabilities about 
empirical facts without any physical significance whatsoever. Hence, when there is a 
superposition there is no fact about, for example, where a microscopic object is lo-
cated. All that we have at our disposal is certain degrees of belief regarding certain ex-
perimental results, whose reality is, prima facie at least, not questioned. Since it is always 
possible, however, to assign a quantum state to macroscopic objects too, the subjec-
tivist’s presumption appears arbitrary. If the quantum state is to have no physical sig-
nificance, this should be so irrespective of whether it refers to the micro-world or the 
macro-world. But, then, don’t superpositions for macroscopic objects imply that there 
is equally no fact regarding certain, seemingly unquestionable, properties of those ob-
jects too (like location)?10 Surely, if this were the case, the end result would be general 
metaphysical anti-realism and, of course, no talk of QM being interpreted realistically 
could be raised. 
 The answer to this more general conundrum is, I think, twofold. First of all, the 
absence of sound first principles, from which a distinction between the classical and 
the quantum realms can be shown to follow naturally, does not imply that all attempts 
to draw such a dividing line are entirely unmotivated. In fact, a number of considera-
tions are available to the subjectivist in her quest to motivate an answer to this prob-
lem. To start with, due to their non-negligible size, ordinary macroscopic objects are 
observable, either directly through our unaided senses or with the use of relatively sim-
ple instruments.11 Furthermore, subjectivism has traditionally been associated with a 
brand of empiricism. On the subjectivist’s view, experience is a reliable source of 
knowledge regarding the nature and basic properties of all observable objects. Hence, 
she appears to be able to claim some sort of ‘privileged access’ to the usual classical 
properties of macroscopic objects (cf. Fuchs and Peres 2000, p. 70). The same, how-
ever, cannot be said with respect to microscopic objects. The latter fall outside the 
scope of experience due to their negligible size, which is why we lack any independent 
access to their fundamental properties.  
 Consequently, and in stark contrast with Hagar’s claim that “one can shift [the cut 
between the observer and Nature] according to whim” (Hagar 2003, p. 767), there 
seems to exist a natural dividing line between the classical and the quantum realms 
that the subjectivist can defend. This line coincides with the observable vs. unobserv-
able distinction. The latter, coupled with an empiricist epistemological presumption, 
allows the subjectivist to assert the independent and unquestionable existence of all 
basic properties of observable macroscopic objects. That those objects can also be as-
                                                     
10 For a more detailed statement of this line of argument see Leggett (2002, R422). 
11 We must carefully distinguish at this point between two related, yet distinct issues regarding the ob-
servable vs. unobservable distinction. The first is the tenability of the distinction itself, which appears 
to be relatively uncontroversial to assert. Indeed, the distinction is both intuitively plausible and also 
psychologically difficult to evade. The second, and more controversial issue, is whether the observ-
able vs. unobservable distinction can ground the fundamental epistemological distinction between be-
lieving that a theory is a true description of the world and ‘accepting’ the theory as empirically ade-
quate while at the same time suspending judgement regarding its truth (cf. van Fraassen 1980, 8-19). 
The controversy surrounding this second issue notwithstanding, Fuchs’s subjectivist need only be 
concerned with the tenability of the distinction in order to motivate her stance.  
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signed quantum states besides their standard classical description, then, can be treated 
by the subjectivist as a peculiarity of the quantum formalism, which nonetheless does 
not suffice to cast doubt on the underlying reality of their basic classical properties.12
 Suppose, however, that the answer sketched in the previous two paragraphs does 
not suffice to alleviate all worries of arbitrariness with respect to the subjectivist’s 
‘quantum/classical cut’. Still —and this is the second part of the answer— we need to 
ask whether the situation is any better even with those theories which allege to have 
gotten rid of the need for a principled quantum vs. classical distinction, like the GRW 
theory that Hagar himself favours (cf. Hagar 2003, pp. 769-772). It turns out that the 
answer to this last question is not trivial at all.  
 As is well known, the GRW theory construes the collapse of the wave function as 
a physical process. It was hoped that in this way the distinction between the quantum 
and the classical world would follow naturally from the theory without the need for an 
ad hoc stipulation. There is strong dissent, however, as to whether GRW strictly speaking 
saves ordinary observable phenomena and, hence, provides a natural classical vs. 
quantum distinction. This is because a GRW-collapse generally produces a strongly local-
ised wave function around one of the possible eigen-states rather than a proper col-
lapse in one of those eigen-states. There is, however, no non-arbitrary way to deter-
mine ‘how much’ of the wave function has to be within an antecedently specified nar-
row interval around the eigen-state for the system to be classically localised. This 
problem is now known as the ‘tails problem’.13 Consequently, it is by no means un-
controversial that even GRW has managed to offer an entirely non-arbitrary account 
of the ‘quantum/classical cut’. 
 It seems fair to conclude, then, that Fuchs’s project neither reduces to thorough-
going metaphysical anti-realism nor postulates the ‘quantum/classical cut’ any more 
arbitrarily than other realist theories of QM. All that Fuchs argues for is that some 
parts of QM yield results, which are best understood as reflecting degrees of belief 
and, hence, deserve an instrumentalist reading. This need not imply that he should 
also be an instrumentalist or anti-realist about all parts of QM, the way Hagar wants it. 
Consequently, Fuchs can perfectly consistently maintain an instrumentalist view of the 
quantum state and a minimal realist view of the quantum system and the dimensional-
ity of the Hilbert space that accompanies it. 
5. Conclusion 
To sum up then: in the course of this paper I examined the validity of Hagar’s claims 
against Fuchs that a subjectivist interpretation of quantum probabilities is inconsistent 
even with a minimal account of quantum mechanical realism and concluded that they 
do not stand up to close scrutiny. It seems to me that Fuchs’s account is perfectly 
consistent and quite immune from the challenge Hagar poses. 
                                                     
12 This seems to be the position that Fuchs and Peres (2000, p. 71) assume in their discussion of the ques-
tion whether QM applies to the observer.  
13 For a discussion of the ‘tails problem’ see Frigg (2003, pp. 43-48).  
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 To be sure, I have not argued in this paper for the more general thesis that no 
‘Wigner’s friend’-type experiment is capable of demonstrating the inconsistency of 
Fuchs’s project. Indeed, a priori it is conceivable that an experiment of this kind might 
eventually succeed. Until such an argument is forthcoming, however, there is another 
strand open to the realist as a way of reaction, deriving from the fact that talk of con-
sistency does not reveal much about a theory’s plausibility. Hence, if one wants to at-
tack Fuchs’ interpretation of quantum probabilities, another option is to focus on 
plausibility rather than possibility issues. Hagar hints at this approach when he charac-
terises Fuchs’s minimalist version of realism “a Pyrrhic victory” (ibid., p. 760), yet he 
does not pursue the argument further. One might object to Fuchs, then, on the 
grounds that his subjectivist account of quantum probabilities implies such an impov-
erished version of realism that any reasonable realist should not be content with. More 
precisely, one might want to suggest that attributing reality only to the two elements 
Fuchs allows fails to capture our realist intuitions underlying the predictive and ex-
planatory success of QM, usually expressed by means of the No-Miracles Argument, 
and is thus an unacceptable form of realism, or, at any rate, not a form of realism in-
spired by what is really distinctive about QM per se. Such an attack, although inevitably 
by no means conclusive given that it does not aim at establishing a contradiction, 
might fare better than Hagar’s unconvincing points. 
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